Recently, Augot and Finiasz presented a coding theoretic public key cryptosystem that suggests a new approach for designing such systems based on the Polynomial Reconstruction Problem. Their cryptosystem is an instantiation of this approach under a specific choice of parameters which, given the state of the art of coding theory, we show in this work to be sub-optimal. Coron showed how to attack the Augot and Finiasz cryptosystem.
Augot and Finiasz's general approach (see figure 1 ) is to use a PR instance which is hard to solve (i.e., a highly noisy instance) as a public key, and to encrypt a message by scaling the given public key (i.e., multiplying the polynomial values by a scalar) and adding to the scaled instance the message which is represented as a slightly lower degree second PR instance which is solvable, yielding a PR instance representing the ciphertext. The receiver who knows the noise locations in the public key can recover the message. The approach allows key sizes that are much smaller than the traditional coding theoretic based public-key systems (i.e., the McEliece cryptosystem [McE78] ). Further, direct use of the above mentioned decoding and list-decoding methods do not apply to breaking the cryptosystem (directly). To implement the approach of figure 1 one needs to specify: (i) the structure of the public-key, (ii) the structure of the error-vector, and in accordance (iii) the decoding method employed in decryption.
What we noticed is that while the public-key structure was chosen to be an unsolvable PR instance, the choice of the error-vector and the associated decoding method was sub-optimal considering the state-of-the-art of Coding Theory. The scheme was in fact, based on unique decoding (and not list decoding techniques) and did not consider probabilistic analysis to maximize the allowed entropy of the error-vector.
The scheme of [AF03] was recently broken by Coron [Cor03a, Cor03c] (without affecting the solvability of PR). The elegant attack presented in [Cor03c] is in fact a ciphertext-only attack that is built on the Berlekamp-Welch method and recovers the message, given knowledge only of the public-key and a ciphertext. A further modification of the scheme, using extension fields but essentially the same system, was suggested recently [AFL03] and was shown by Coron [Cor03b] to be vulnerable to essentially the same attack. Coding Theoretic Motivation. The Augot-Finiasz cryptosystem employed unique decoding techniques rather than list-decoding techniques (assuming that unique decoding is what is needed for a correct cryptosystem -an assumption we refute herein). Moreover, they consider only worst-case analysis in the selection of the code parameters. Thus, their cryptosystem is sub-optimal in the above respects given the general approach outlined above.
This leaves open the question of whether this general approach works in principle, i.e., when one uses the optimal coding theoretic techniques and probabilistic analysis for the parameter selection. Our Results: In this work we investigate the above question. In particular, we maximize the rate of the error vector used during encryption and choose state-of-the-art list-decoding techniques to implement the Reed-Solomon decoding step for decryption. Regarding the optimization (maximization) of the error-rate we make two key observations (1) the system of [AF03] employs a worst-case approach in selecting this parameter; a probabilistic approach (that we perform in this work) allows higher values. (2) the system of [AF03] employs BerlekampWelch RS-decoding for the decryption operation. We emphasize that more powerful decoding techniques can be employed that allow larger values for the error-rate parameter. Our methodology is to use an extended set of tools both for design and analysis in order to get the best possible instantiations of the general approach. The tools include "list decoding" rather than unique decoding techniques (which we show to be still good for decryption, since decoding to a unique value is assured with extremely high probability over a large enough field, even when ambiguous decoding is allowed, cf. Lemma 5).
We develop our presentation as a ping-pong game between a cryptosystems designer and a cryptanalyst. To avoid any misunderstanding our goal is not to design a new cryptosystem, but rather using the design and cryptanalysis steps as a methodology for exploring the general approach.
First
Step. Regarding our key-observation (1) we employ the tails of the hypergeometric distribution to show that the original scheme allowed too few errors in the error-vector to be used by the message encryption process. Thus the error-rate can be increased high enough to aid the designer to achieve instances of the cryptosystem where Coron's analysis does not work. But, nevertheless we provide an alternative probabilistic analysis showing that the original attack of Coron would work almost always even in this modified (more noisy) version, thus aiding the cryptanalyst. Second
Step. Combining our key-observations (1) and (2) above, we discover the optimal setting for the sender error-parameter ("optimal" under the assumption that the GuruswamiSudan list-decoding algorithm [GS98] represents the best possible decoding algorithm against Polynomial Reconstruction). We show that the optimal parameter setting, helps the designer and in this case Coron's attack fails. To answer our question about the limit of the approach, we then present a new attack that is based on the Sudan and Guruswami-Sudan algorithms [Sud97, GS98] . Our attack, with overwhelming probability, breaks even the optimal parameter setting. This means that the general approach, outlined in figure 1, taken by Augot and Finiasz (rather than merely their non-optimal instantiation) breaks.
We believe that our results demonstrate how design and analysis of Coding theory based cryptography, must employ probabilistic methods and state of the art decoding techniques. Furthermore, our results and the attack of Coron demonstrate that PR-based cryptosystems that lack formal proofs of security by concrete reduction arguments, even when they seem to be related to PR, are potentially susceptible to coding theoretic attacks that do not imply any weakness in the PR problem itself. Note that, the private-key cryptosystem based on PR suggested by the authors in [KY02] was shown to be semantically secure under an intractability decisional assumption that bears upon the average-case PR (for choices of the parameters beyond the Guruswami-Sudan solvability bound). This cryptosystem (as well as the other cryptographic primitives in [KY02] ) are not affected by the techniques of the present paper and of Coron's [Cor03a, Cor03b, Cor03c] and breaking these designs seems to require significant advances in RS decodability. Organization. In section 2 we present the background for the present work, i.e., the [AF03] public-key cryptosystem as well as the attacks that were proposed by Coron [Cor03c] ; we also present the general approach suggested by the cryptosystem of [AF03] as well as the cryptanalytic framework that we will employ. In section 3 we show how using probabilistic analysis we can improve the error-parameter of the encryption function and in section 4, using again probabilistic analysis, we show that this will not help securing the cryptosystem. In section 5 we proceed to show how to employ list-decoding techniques in order to optimize the parameter selection and we demonstrate how the optimal version can thwart Coron's attack. In turn, in section 6 we show how the optimal variant also succumbs in a ciphertext-only attack. Finally the work is summarized in section 7.
2 Background: the Recent Polynomial-Based Public-Key Cryptosystem
We review the recent developments, while setting up the necessary notations and interesting points regarding our investigation.
The Cryptosystem of [AF03]
The cryptosystem of [AF03] can be described in high level as follows:
1. The public-key is a PR-instance of parameters [n, k + 1, W ] for which (i) the hidden polynomial p is monic; (ii) solving the instance is considered hard. The public-key is a sequence of values in (IF × IF) n (while the locations of the error points is the secret key).
2. Encryption operates by first transposing (i.e., scaling the polynomial of) the publickey using a random value α ∈ IF (the encryption coefficient), and then adding to the transposed public-key the message (evaluated as a second polynomial represented as pairs of points using the same first coordinates as the points of the public key PR instance, with no errors), and finally adding some additional w errors. (In other words, the message is embedded in a second PR instance with w errors and added to the transposed public key). It follows that a ciphertext is a sequence of values in (IF × IF) n .
3. Decryption removes the points that correspond to public-key errors, i.e., W points of the ciphertext. Decryption relies on the following two facts: (i) the remaining n − W points can be decoded into a polynomial p * ; (ii) due to the fact that the message polynomial is selected to be of degree less than the degree of the monic polynomial p hidden in the public-key, it follows that the recovery of p * implies the recovery of the encryption coefficient α. The message polynomial can be recovered as
We note that the points over which the polynomials are evaluated in a PR instance can be publicly known (thus the public-key and the ciphertext can be considered to be of size only |IF| n ).
In more detail, let z 1 , . . . , z n ∈ IF be arbitrary distinct elements of the underlying field, where n ∈ IN is a security parameter. The public-key of the system is a PR-instance that is generated as follows: first a random tuple E 1 , . . . , E n is selected that has exactly W non-zero randomly selected elements from IF. Second, a random polynomial p of degree less than k is selected. The public-key is set to pk := { z i , y i } n i=1 where
is a random PR-instance with parameters n, k, W . The encryption operation is defined with domain IF k and general range the set (IF × IF) n . The message msg is encoded as a polynomial of degree less than k, denoted by p msg (x); a random tuple e 1 , . . . , e n is selected so that it has exactly w non-zero randomly selected field elements; a random element α ∈ IF is selected as well. The ciphertext that corresponds to msg is the sequence of pairs { z i , y i } n i=1 defined as follows y i = αy i + p msg (z i ) + e i , for i = 1, . . . , n. So far, the above represents a general approach. The exact choice of parameters (as a function of n, say) gives the specific system of [AF03] .
The decryption operates as follows: let I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be such that |I| = n − W and for all i ∈ I it holds that E i = 0 (from the selection of the public-key). Observe now that the sequence of pairs C = { z i , y i } i∈I can be seen as a PR-instance with parameters [n − W, k + 1, w]. Now suppose that,
This condition implies that the PR-instance has a unique solution that can be recovered by the unique decoding technique of Berlekamp-Welch algorithm. Given such solution p * (x) it follows that the leading coefficient of p * will be equal to α (by construction, we have that the polynomial hidden into the public-key is monic and of degree k while the degree of the message polynomial is at most k − 1). Then, the transmitted message can be recovered as follows
A second condition is that W should be large, beyond the known bounds of list-decoding, to assure that a third party cannot simply get the error locations of the public key (and thus decrypt all ciphertexts). This condition is the base of the presumed security of the scheme.
A Cryptanalytic Framework
The Cryptanalytic problem that is the basic building block for mounting a ciphertext-only attack on the Public-Key Cryptosystem of [AF03] as described above is defined as follows:
Definition 2 Ciphertext-only Attack Problem (CAP) Given two sequences of tuples
and parameters n, k, w, W that satisfy the following conditions
Goal. Find a list of values of polynomial-length that contains the value α.
Any algorithm that solves CAP in polynomial-time can be turned into a ciphertext-only attack against the cryptosystem of [AF03], as the following proposition reveals.
Proposition 3 Let A be an algorithm that solves CAP in polynomial-time. Then any message encrypted in the cryptosystem of [AF03] can be decrypted without knowledge of the secret-key in polynomial-time in the security parameter.
Proof.: Observe that due to the definition of the cryptosystem the condition i of definition 2 is satisfied. Also if we set the public-key to be X 1 and the ciphertext to be X 2 it follows that conditions ii, iii of definition 2 are also satisfied. Thus, we can apply (simulate) A on X 1 , X 2 to obtain α. Now observe that due to conditions iii and i we can decode
(using the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm) to obtain the transmitted message p msg (x) (unique solution). A guarantees polynomially many candidates for α, thus the above reduction will be successful in returning the plaintext with probability at most 1/poly.
Coron's Attack
In [Cor03c] , Coron presented an elegant ciphertext-only attack against the cryptosystem of [AF03]. We explain the attack briefly below and we show that in fact it can be seen as an algorithm to solve CAP (in fact our formulation of CAP above is motivated by the original attack and by further extensions of this idea in the sequel).
Let X 1 , X 2 be an instance of CAP, with
and parameters k, w, W, n. Due to condition iii of definition 2 it follows that there exist p ∈ IF[x] of degree less than k and α ∈ IF, so that p(z i ) = y i − αy i for at most w indexes i.
The attack modifies the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm: Let E(x) be a monic polynomial of degree w such that E(z i ) = 0 for exactly those indexes i for which p(z i ) = y i − αy i . The existence of this polynomial is guaranteed due to the condition iii of definition 2. Let N (x) = p(x)E(x) be a polynomial of degree less than k + w.
Now consider the following system of equations
(system 1) that has as unknowns the 2w + k coefficients of the polynomials E, N . Observe that the above system (with λ as a parameter) is not homogeneous (due to the fact that E is monic). Recall that all steps up to this point follow exactly the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm (modulo the unknown λ value). Now consider the slightly extended system below:
where E (x) is a non-monic polynomial that has the same properties as E (i.e. E and E have the same roots). It follows that system 2 defined above is homogeneous with 2w + k + 1 unknowns. Let A 2 [λ] be the n × (2w + k + 1)-matrix of system 2.
Due to condition i of definition 2 the number of equations n satisfies n ≥ 2w + k + 1 and thus system 2 has at least as many equations as unknowns.
Case 1 of the Attack. rank(A 2 [0]) = 2w + k + 1 (i.e., A 2 [0] is of full rank). It follows that there are 2w + k + 1 linearly independent equations in system 2 for λ = 0 (and their locations can be recovered e.g. by Gaussian elimination). Without loss of generality let us assume that these are the equations on locations 1, . . . , 2w + k + 1. We eliminate the remaining n − (2w + k + 1) equations from system 2, to make it a square homogeneous system, and we call the remaining equations system 3.
It follows that if we substitute the value α for λ in the matrix of the system 3, the matrix is singular since it accepts a solution (the polynomials E , N ) that is non-trivial. As a result the matrix of system 3, denoted by A 3 [λ], has the following property:
Now observe that the determinant of system 3 is a polynomial f (λ) := det(A 3 [λ] ) that is of degree at most w + 1 (because λ is only involved in the part of the matrix of system 3 that corresponds to the polynomial E ).
Further observe that f (0) = det(A 3 [0]) = 0 because of our selection of A 3 [λ] to have the property that A 3 [0] is the full rank minor of the matrix A 2 [0]. Thus, the value α is among the w + 1 roots of f and the output will be the list of roots of f . It follows that the above algorithm gives an efficient solution for the CAP problem.
Case 2 of the Attack. rank(A 2 [0]) < 2w + k + 1. In this case one can find a non-trivial solution of the system A 2 [0] which defines two non-zero polynomials E , N such that
Since
Let I be the subset of {1, . . . , n} for which it holds that i ∈ I ⇐⇒ (e i = 0)
Recall that the degree of the polynomial N is less than k + w and E is a polynomial of degree w; it follows that E (x)p * (x) is a polynomial of degree w + k.
Observe that |I| is a random variable (denoted by η) ranging from n − w − W to n − max{w, W }. Next consider this relation:
Under the above relation, it follows that |I| ≥ w + k + 1 and as a result the polynomials E (x)p * (x) and N (x) are equal. It follows immediately that p * = N E ; naturally given p * we recover α immediately and non-ambiguously (in fact, in this case we will even be able to recover the value of the secret-key).
Performing a worst-case analysis of the above, we know that η ≥ n − w − W and as a result the attack would go through as long as n − w − W > w + k ⇐⇒ n > 2w + W + k something that matches condition #1 of the [AF03]-cryptosystem (cf. section 2.1) and thus the case 2 of the attack can be carried for the parameters of the cryptosystem (without even taking into account that η would be somewhat larger than its lower bound n − w − W ).
On the other hand, it would be of interest to us to find a necessary condition for case 2 of the attack (the reason for this will become clear in section 3). This can be found by setting η to its highest possible value and requiring this to be greater than w+k: η := n−max{w, W } > w+k; this is equivalent to: n > w + max{w, W } + k (Necessary condition for Case 2)
The Increased Error Case
The cryptosystem of [AF03] mandates that the number of errors introduced by the sender in the formation of the ciphertext is less or equal to
(condition #1 of section 2.1), to ensure unique decoding in the reduced PR-instance that is obtained after removing the W locations that contain the errors of the Public-Key.
We observe that the bound on w is unreasonably low, for the following reason: many of the errors introduced by the sender will fall into the error-area of the public-key, and thus they will not affect the decryption operation (i.e., introducing a new error in an already erroneous location is a case where 1 + 1 = 1).
To see this better, we can think of the sender in the cryptosystem to be playing the following game: he selects w points out of n and randomizes them. Since W of these points will be discarded by the receiver it follows that the number of the good points (out of the total n − W of good points) that will be randomized by the sender follow a hypergeometric distribution with mean value n−W n . It follows that the expected number of good points that will be randomized by the sender are w n−W n . In order to ensure decoding for the decryption operation it suffices to forceẽ ≤
whereẽ is a random variable that follows the hypergeometric distribution with mean
, for some > 0. Using the Chvátal bound for the hypergeometric distribution, [Chv79] , we have that ] ≤ e −2 2 w , and thus condition # 1 of section 2.1 will be satisfied in the probabilistic sense and decryption will succeed with probability 1 − e −2 2 w .
We will concentrate on parameters s.t. W > w and w is selected as above. Consider for example the assignment n = 2000, k = 100, W ≥ 1556 (to avoid an attack with [GS98] on the public-key), e.g. we set W = 1600, and = 1/6; now observe that W/n = 0.8 > 1/6. The equation for w mentioned above yields w = 407. It follows that the probability of correct decryption is 1 − e −2 407 36 = 1 − e −22 ≈ 1 − 2 −31 . Observe now that case 2 of Coron's attack would be foiled since the necessary condition fails: n > w + max{w, W } + k ⇐⇒ 2000 > 1600 + 407 + 100 ⇐⇒ false Thus, by merely increasing the number of errors that the sender of the cryptosystem introduces during encryption (relying on randomization to allow decryption with very high probability), we are capable of thwarting the analysis of Coron's attack (in particular the analysis of case 2 of the attack). Observe that this is possible without any other modification of the cryptosystem whatsoever.
Nevertheless, this is only a temporary comfort as we will prove in the next section.
With High Probability Modified Coron's Attack Succeeds against Increased Errors
Next, we use another probabilistic analytical tool to show that, in fact, in spite of the increased errors, the attack actually works with high probability.
First, observe the error-increase we introduced in section 3 does not apply to case 1 of Coron's attack. Indeed, one can show for any > 0 that
and the condition w ≤ (n − k − 1)/2 is sufficient for case 1 to go through (that is, if we can apply it). Recall that case 1 of the attack only applies to the case det(A 3 [0]) = 0.
We will show that this in fact happens most of the times (a fact observed in practice in [Cor03c] but not proved). This means that the attack works even in the increased error setting of the previous section. Let us recall the matrix of system 2, as defined in section 2.3.
where B 2 is a Vandermonde matrix of dimension w + k over the elements z 1 , . . . , z n ; B 2 corresponds to the coefficients of N (x); C 2 [λ] is a Vandermonde matrix of dimension w + 1 over the elements z 1 , . . . , z n where its i-th row is multiplied by y i − λy i , for i = 1, . . . , n; C 2 corresponds to the coefficients of E (x). Recall that A 2 [λ] is a n × (2w + k + 1) matrix. We would like to prove that rank(A 2 [0]) = 2w + k + 1 with overwhelming probability.
If rank(A 2 [0]) < 2w + k + 1 then it follows that any (2w + k + 1)-minor of A 2 [0] is singular. Below we show that this event can only happen with very small probability (assuming that the underlying finite field IF is large -something that is assumed in [AF03]) thus we deduce that the first case of the attack would work almost always.
Theorem 4 Let P = Prob[rank(A 2 [0]) < 2w + k + 1] be the probability that the rank of A 2 [0] is less than 2w + k + 1 where the probability is taken over all possible choices for the given CAP instance out of which we construct A 2 [λ]. It holds that P ≤ 2w/|IF| and the proof works even if the first inequality of condition i of definition 2 is relaxed to only w ≤ (n − k − 1)/2.
Proof.: First observe that due to the conditions i of definition 2 it holds that W > w (even under the relaxation w ≤ (n − k − 1)/2). Suppose that the selection of the error-locations for a CAP instance is denoted by r. Let J r be a subset of {1, . . . , n} such that |J r | = 2w + k + 1 and J overlaps with all elements i ∈ {1, . . . , n} that have the property e i = 0, as well as at least one element i 0 ∈ {1, . . . , n} with the property e i 0 = 0 but E i 0 = 0 (the existence of i 0 is assured by the fact W > w). Let us now define a minor M r of A 2 [0]
We will show that for any r, M r is of full rank with very high probability over the remaining coin-tosses that sample a CAP instance (even in the relaxed setting w ≤ (n − k − 1)/2). Recall that we have that y i = αy i + p msg (z i ) + e i where p msg (x) ∈ IF[x] is a polynomial of degree less than k and e 1 , . . . , e n is a tuple of Hamming weight w. Also that, y i = p(z i ) + E i + z k i , where E 1 , . . . , E n is a random tuple of Hamming weight W . It follows that every column among the w + 1 rightmost columns of M r can be written as
Now observe that we can view det(M r ) as a multivariate polynomial on the variables α, e 1 , . . . , e n , E 1 , . . . , E n , a 0 , . . . , a k−1 , b 0 , . . . , b k−1 where a 0 , . . . , a k−1 are the coefficients of p(x) and b 0 , . . . , b k−1 are the coefficients of p msg (x). These variables are either free, or bound to be 0 (e.g. if randomness r dictates that i is not among the error-locations of the public-key it holds that E i is bound to be 0).
Without loss of generality we may assume that r and J r are selected so that e 1 , . . . , e w , E w+1 are free variables (i.e. correspond to random error-locations); note that any other possibility would work in the same way. Now let us consider the following assignment to the multi-variate polynomial det(M r ): 
The above determinant is non-zero (it can be seen easily as an application of well-known properties of Vandermonde matrices), and as a result the multivariate polynomial det(M r ) is not the zero-polynomial. It follows from Schwartz's Lemma, [Sch80] , that the ratio of the roots of the non-zero multivariate polynomial det(M r ) is bounded from above by τ /IF where τ ≤ 2w is the total degree of det(M r ).
The Most General AF System Avoids Coron's Attack

An "optimal variant" of the [AF03] cryptosystem
In this section we show that the number of errors w introduced by the sender can, in fact, be increased further beyond the improved bound that we describe in section 3, by employing the proper decoding method for decryption (cf. figure 1) . In particular, we make the following crucial observation: [AF03] requires that w is below the error-correction bound of Reed-Solomon Codes, so that the decryption (decoding) is unique. Nevertheless the introduction of random errors in a large enough finite field (such fields are utilized in [AF03] ) suggests that uniqueness of decoding can be ensured far beyond the error-correction bound.
In the lemma below we show that randomly selected PR instances that can accept two different decodings are unlikely. This probabilistic analysis allow us to resort to modern listdecoding techniques in the sequel.
be a RS-Code codeword of a random message p ∈ IF[x] with degree(p) < k that has e errors uniformly random distributed over IF, s.t. e < n − k. Then, the probability that it accepts another decoding p ∈ IF[x] with p = p is at most n t 2 /(|IF| n−e−k ) (the probability is taken over all possible messages and noise corruptions).
Proof.: In the proof below we consider the values z 1 , . . . , z n fixed (as is customary). For some n, k and t := n − e we denote by A 1 the number of tuples from IF n that are partially corrupted RS-codewords with at most e errors. Furthermore we denote by A 2 the number of strings from IF n that are partially corrupted RS-codewords with at most e errors and accept more than one decoding.
First observe that A 1 ≥ |IF| n−t+k . This is easy to see since these are the number of degrees of freedom for selecting the n − t error points and the k coefficients of a polynomial solution.
In order to approximate A 2 observe the following: let p, p ∈ IF[x] be the different ways to decode a partially corrupted RS-codeword with e errors. Suppose that they overlap in m points; clearly m ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. It follows that the total number of ways to select p, p is |IF| 2k−m . For the remaining points the total number of ways to select them is |IF| n−2t+m . It follows easily that A 2 ≤ n t
It is clear from the statement of the Lemma that the probability that we would like to approximate equals A 2 /A 1 . Now observe that,
this completes the proof. Now observe that if the "message rate" is κ := k/n and the "error-rate" is := e/n, with κ, ∈ Q + then it follows that the probability in lemma 5 is less than 4 n |IF| (1− −κ)n . As a result, provided that IF satisfies |IF| 1− −κ > 4 it follows that the probability of proposition 5 is "negligible."
Optimal Parameter Setting & Modifications for the Cryptosystem of [AF03] . Taking advantage of the above Lemma in conjunction with the observation of section 3, we can increase the error-parameter w further. We refer to our choice as optimal with respect to figure 1 under the basic assumption that the list-decoding algorithm of [GS98] represents the state of the art in RS-decodability.
Below we assume that the sender employs the algorithm of [GS98] for decryption. For this algorithm to work it should hold thatẽ < (n−W )− (n − W )k whereẽ is the number of errors introduced in the area of good points of the public-key due to the encryption operation. As argued in section 3,ẽ is a random variable following a hypergeometric distribution with mean w n−W n . In our analysis below we will simply substituteẽ for the expected number of errors. Note that this does not guarantee that the receiver will be capable of recovering the transmitted message "most of the times." To guarantee this we would have to show that the probability Prob[ẽ < (n − W ) − (n − W )k] is overwhelming (as we did in section 3), something that cannot simply be inferred from the fact that the mean ofẽ is less than (n − W ) − (n − W )k; in order for the receiver to be able to decrypt most of the times we would instead require that the mean ofẽ is sufficiently lower than the bound (n − W ) − (n − W )k and then employ the Chvátal bound on the tails of the hypergeometric distribution to bound the error probability by a negligible fraction, [Chv79] (as in section 3).
Nevertheless, since we intend to cryptanalyze the resulting cryptosystem, we will opt for simply substitutingẽ for its mean, as this would only make our attack stronger. On the other hand observe that a public-key cryptosystem that works, say, half the times is still quite useful. Thus, substitutingẽ for w n−W n we obtain
We conclude that the optimal selection would allow the parameter w to be selected as high as:
The new bound above increases the number of errors that we can allow the sender to introduce, as long as W is selected appropriately:
Proposition 6 There are choices for W such that W ≥ n − n(k − 1) and n(1
, as long as k ≥ 5 and k/n ≤ 1/16.
Proof.: The first inequality W ≥ n − n(k − 1) can be written as
n and it provides a lower bound for W/n. We will see that the second inequality yields an upper bound for W/n: indeed, n(1
can be rewritten as n+k+1 2 > n k n−W ; to satisfy this latter inequality it suffices to provide a W that satisfies n + k > 2n k n−W , or (n − W )(n 2 + 2nk + k 2 ) > 4n 2 k. The latter inequality is equivalent to n(
It follows that we must show,
Given that k ≥ 5 we deduce that 20k ≥ 16 k 2 k−1 , thus it suffices to show that (n+k) 4 > 20n 3 k, which is equivalent to n 4 −16n 3 k+6n 2 k 2 +4nk 3 +k 4 > 0 which is true provided that k/n ≥ 1/16.
On the other hand, observe that if k is very large it holds that k 2 k−1 ≈ k; thus we derive that if κ := k/n it holds that κ should satisfy κ 4 + 4κ 3 + 6κ 2 − 12κ + 1 > 0; as an equation the left-hand-side has two real roots, κ = 1 and κ ≈ 0.0873; it follows that an upper bound for κ is 1/11. Now recall that the necessary condition for Coron's attack (both cases) is w ≤ n−k−1 2
. It follows from the proposition above that our analysis puts the parameter w beyond the range of Coron's attack, provided that W is properly selected. To illustrate this concretely, suppose that n = 2500 and k = 101. Then, W should be selected in the range [2000, . . . , 2126]; if we make the choice W = 2063 then we can set w to be as high as 1298, whereas Coron's attack would correct any value of w only up to 1199. Note that the gap of 99 elements between the bound of Coron's attack and the assignment w = 1298 ensures that the application of the attack by removing 99 points at random would only succeed with probability less than (0.52) 99 ≈ 2 −96 (since the ratio of the sender-introduced error points is ≈ 0.52).
Corollary 7 Coron's attack cannot be applied against the [AF03] -cryptosystem in the optimal parameter setting.
To draw a parallel to our exposition in section 2.2, we introduce the problem CAP+ to stand for the ciphertext-only attack problem of the optimal variant of Augot and Finiasz Cryptosystem, (the only difference from CAP being in the choice of w):
Definition 8 Ciphertext-only Attack Problem in the optimal parameter setting (CAP+) Given two sequences of tuples
and parameters k, w, W that satisfy the following conditions i. w < n(1 − k n−W ), and W ≥ n − n(k − 1).
is a random PR-instance with parameters [n, k, w].
As before we show that any algorithm that solves CAP+ can be used to mount a ciphertextonly attack on the cryptosystem of [AF03] (but now in the optimal parameter setting):
Proposition 9 Let A be an algorithm that solves CAP+ in polynomial-time. Then any message encrypted in the cryptosystem of [AF03] in the optimal parameter setting can be decrypted without knowledge of the secret-key in polynomial-time in the security parameter.
Proof.: Similar to the proof of proposition 3 with the difference that now Guruswami-Sudan's algorithm, [GS98] , should be employed instead of the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm.
In the Lemma below we give an upper bound on the value of w (that is independent of W ).
Lemma 10 For any CAP+ instance, it holds that n − w > 4 n 3 (k − 1).
The Attack Against the General System Employing ListDecoding
The results we present in this section (essentially an algorithm for solving CAP+) is based on Sudan's list-decoding algorithm, [Sud97] and Guruswami Sudan [GS98] algorithms (for both there are efficient polynomial-time algorithms, see [McE03] ).
The attack
Let n, k, w, W ∈ Z and
be an instance of CAP+. We denoteŷ i := y i − λy i for i = 1, . . . , n, where λ is an unspecified parameter (free variable); to set the parameter λ to a specific value α we will writeŷ i [α] .
According to the definition of a CAP+ instance we know that there exists a value α ∈ IF (the "encryption coefficient") and a polynomial p ∈ IF[x] of degree less than k (the "message polynomial") that agrees with n − w of the points z i ,ŷ i [α] . Define l := n − w − 1. Next we consider the following system of equations on a set of unknowns {q j 1 ,j 2 } j 1 ≥0,j 2 ≥0,j 1 +(k−1)j 2 <l (called system 4): ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Observe that any solution to system 4 above defines a bivariate polynomial Q(x, y) that satisfies the property degree Q,x + (k − 1)degree Q,y < l.
Lemma 11
The number of unknowns of system 4, is at least
Proof.: The number of unknowns can be easily seen to be equal to the following double sum:
Recall that from proposition 6 we know that we only consider parameter choices that satisfy k/n ≤ 1/16. For such range of parameters (and sufficiently large n) we, in fact, show:
Lemma 12 System 4 is not overdefined provided that n ≥ 19 and k/n ≤ 1/9.
Proof.: In order for system 4 to be not overdefined it suffices to show that,
This can be satisfied provided that (n − w − 1)(n − w − 2) ≥ 2(k − 1)n ⇐⇒ (n − w) 2 ≥ 2(k − 1)n − 2 + 3(n − w)
Now observe that, 2 3 (n − w) 2 ≥ 2(k − 1)n. Indeed (n − w) 2 > n 3 (k − 1) (from lemma 10), and it holds that n 3 (k − 1) ≥ 3(k − 1)n ⇐⇒ k − 1 n ≤ 1 9 which is true for our range of parameters.
Next consider the inequality 1 3 (n − w) 2 ≥ 3(n − w); it is equivalent to n − w ≥ 9 which will be satisfied as long as 4 n 3 (k − 1) ≥ 9 which is true for n ≥ 19. We conclude that (n − w) 2 = 2 3 (n − w) 2 + 1 3 (n − w) 2 ≥ 2(k − 1)n + 3(n − w) ≥ 2(k − 1)n − 2 + 3(n − w) which completes the proof.
Subsequently we omit the appropriate number of unknowns from system 4, to equalize the number of unknowns and equations. This results in a square homogeneous system of n equations and unknowns that we call system 5. We denote the matrix of system 5 by A[λ]. Recall that of the n points { z i ,ŷ i [α] } n i=1 , at least n − w of them belong the graph of the polynomial p, which is of degree less than k.
Let i 0 be one of these points and consider the system that results after removing from system 5 the equation below:
We will call the resulting system that has one equation less, "system 6." It is immediate that system 6 is an underspecified homogeneous system. It follows that it accepts a non-trivial solution.
Now observe that any non-trivial solution to system 6 defines a bivariate polynomial R ∈ IF[x, y] that has the following properties:
Summary
In this section, we summarize our cryptanalytic results.
Given an instance of CAP+ { z i , y i } n i=1 , { z i , y i } n i=1 with parameters n, k, w, W . 0. Set l := n − w − 1. figure 2 we overview the CAP+ algorithm that was presented in the previous section. Using this, the general cryptosystem based on Augot and Finiasz [AF03] , even under the optimal choice of parameters is broken under ciphertext-only attacks. The breaking algorithm is summarized in figure 3 .
Given the public-key and a ciphertext of the [AF03]-cryptosystem with parameters n, k, w, W . 1. if w ≤ n−k−1 2 invoke case 1 of Coron's attack. 2. else invoke the CAP+ algorithm of figure 1, and recover the plaintext using Guruswami-Sudan algorithm (as described in proposition 9). Note that the attack outlined above is probabilistic and is guaranteed to work with very high probability as we have shown in theorem 4 (for case 1 of Coron's attack), and theorem 14 (for CAP+ algorithm).
